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ABSTRACT  
Evidence is the key to solve any crime. Evidence integrity needs to be protected in order to make 
it admissible in the court of law. Digital evidence is more revealing, but it is fragile; it can easily 
be tampered with or modified. There are different techniques available to protect the integrity of 
digital evidence. Different automated digital evidence acquisition tools are available in the market. 
In this paper, we have analyzed two automated tools (EnCase and FTK Imager) that are used for 
disk imaging. These tools claim to protect the integrity of digital evidence. The techniques used 
by these tools are analyzed in this paper. Problems with their approaches are discussed and a 
solution is proposed to address the problems. A prototype of an automated tool is developed with 
an implementation of the proposed solution.  
Keywords: Digital evidence, integrity, chain of custody, digital hash, digital signature, disk 
imaging  
 
 INTRODUCTION 
Generally, when a crime is committed, 
evidence is collected from the crime scene. The 
criminal is identified after the examination and 
analysis of the evidence. In order to prosecute 
the criminal, a court requires sound evidence. 
If integrity of the evidence presented in court 
could not be proved then it becomes 
inadmissible. If there is even a doubt that the 
evidence could have been tampered with then 
its integrity becomes questionable. If there is 
some period of time when the evidence could 
have been mishandled or it could have been in 
the custody of an unauthorized person, its 
integrity is doubted. From the time of 
collection of the evidence till the prosecution of 
the case, evidence integrity must be kept 
sound and its chain of custody must also be 
made tamperproof.  
A former Xerox engineer, Larry Benedict, 
45, was sentenced to four years in prison by a 
federal judge. He was accused of trafficking in 
child pornography. All the evidence in this 
case was electronic. Larry Benedict hired a 
computer expert who found evidence that 
pointed towards his innocence. It was found 
that all the evidence presented in court was 
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allegedly tampered with or otherwise altered 
after it was in government custody (“Electronic 
evidence anchors porn case - CNET,” n.d.). In 
another case, Jodi Arias in Arizona was 
arrested and found guilty of murder of Travis 
Alexander. She was sentenced to death. She 
hired a computer forensics expert to examine 
the victim computer. It was found that 
thousands of files were deleted from the 
computer while it was in the custody of Mesa 
police department (“Did Mesa Police Botch 
The Arias Case?,” n.d.). The problem of 
corruption exists worldwide and law 
enforcement agencies are not an exception to 
that. The need of protection and preservation 
of digital evidence during the extraction phase 
is emphasized in the paper (Saleem, Popov, & 
Bagilli, 2014). It is also emphasized in the 
IOEC’s guidelines (Enfsi, 2009). In order to 
minimize human interaction and subjectivity, 
it is important to automate the system for 
preservation of digital evidence integrity and 
its chain of custody.  
Digital evidence is fragile in nature and it 
is handled differently. The process of collection 
and archiving digital evidence is outlined in 
RFC3227 (Brezinski & Killalea, 2002). Many 
tools have been developed to aid forensic 
examiners in gathering and preserving digital 
evidence. These tools use message digest to 
ensure integrity of the digital evidence. Only 
message digest is not enough to guarantee the 
integrity of the digital evidence (Lee, Kim, 
Lee, & Lim, 2005), because it can easily be 
forged. Authors (Aoki, Guo, Matusiewicz, 
Sasaki, & Wang, 2009) (Robshaw, 1996) (Xie, 
Liu, & Feng, 2006) (Wang, Yin, & Yu, 2005) 
(Wang & Yu, 2005) describe some of the 
methods to forge integrity.  
The PIDESC Model (Saleem & Popov, 
2011) provides a solution to deal with the 
problem in message digests but it ignores the 
protection of the chain of custody. Not only 
the evidence, but also the chain of custody 
needs to be protected and made tamperproof. 
There is need of a method that can ensure not 
only protection of the digital evidence 
integrity, but also preservation of the digital 
chain of custody.   
This paper consists of seven sections, 
including references. The current section 
explains the problem that needs to be solved. 
Second and third sections discuss digital 
evidence integrity protection techniques 
currently being used and their shortcomings. 
Then in the fourth section, our solution is 
explained. The fifth section is based on the 
analysis and comparison of our solution with 
the currently present solutions. Section six 
gives conclusion and future directions. The last 
section is composed of references.           
 CURRENT PRACTICES 
FOR DIGITAL 
EVIDENCE 
INTEGRITY 
PROTECTION 
In this section, we will discuss the techniques 
that are used by FTK Imager (“Product 
Download,” 2014) and Encase (Guidance 
Software, 2016) to protect digital evidence 
integrity.  
 Integrity Protection by FTK 
Imager 
FTK Imager is a disk imaging tool. It can be 
used for imaging of logical drives as well as 
physical drives.  It supports four different 
formats to store the extracted image. These 
formats are AD1, E01, RAW and SMART. 
Digital evidence integrity is ensured by 
calculating MD5 and SHA1 hashes of the 
extracted content and storing it in a report 
along with other details related to the drive. It 
also offers an encryption feature to ensure the 
confidentiality of the digital evidence. The 
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digital evidence can be encrypted by using a 
password or a digital certificate.  
The documentation of FTK Imager 
recommends using “Write Blocking Hardware” 
so that digital evidence contents are not 
changed during the data extraction phase. 
 Integrity Protection by 
Encase 
Encase is a forensics tool and it is used to 
extract an image of the whole drive. The 
extracted image is stored in E01 format. 
Integrity of the extracted contents is ensured 
by generating CRC and digital hashes (MD5 
and SHA1). It also provides an optional 
feature of encryption to ensure the 
confidentiality of the extracted contents.  
Just like FTK Imager, Encase recommends 
using “Write Blocking Hardware.” 
 SHORTCOMINGS OF 
CURRENT PRACTICES 
In this section, we will discuss the problems 
with the practices used by the FTK Imager 
and Encase. 
 Problems with FTK Imager 
There are a few points that need to be 
addressed in the approach used by the FTK 
Imager. Firstly, there is no functionality 
present in it that can verify or authenticate 
the person who is extracting the forensic 
image. Anyone can enter the name of anyone 
else as a forensic examiner and extract the 
image. There is no way of knowing that 
evidence was, indeed, extracted by an 
authorized person. So, there is a big question 
on the soundness of the evidence. Secondly, 
integrity of the evidence is provided through 
hashes. Hashes are not enough to guarantee 
the integrity of the evidence. If contents of the 
evidence are modified and hashes are 
recalculated and stored, then the changes in 
the evidence will go undetected. This again 
makes the integrity of the evidence 
questionable. If encryption is used then it 
becomes difficult for the modifications to go 
undetected but still possible (Saleem & Popov, 
2011).  
 Problems with Encase 
Just like the FTK Imager, Encase does not 
provide any functionality to verify or 
authenticate the person who is extracting the 
forensic image. So, there is no way of knowing 
who actually extracted the evidence that 
makes integrity of the evidence questionable. 
Encase uses MDCs to provide integrity, but 
MDCs are not enough to ensure the integrity 
and can be forged. In (Saleem & Popov, 2011), 
it is discussed in detail that how can MDCs be 
forged and even using encryption with MDCs 
does not guarantee the integrity.  
Both the FTK Imager and the Encase 
claim to ensure the integrity of digital 
evidence, but the techniques used by these 
tools leave the evidence integrity questionable. 
Moreover, these tools do not offer any 
functionality that can enforce chain of custody 
preservation.  
 PROPOSED SOLUTION 
It is evident from above that digital hash or 
MDCs alone are not enough to guarantee the 
integrity of digital evidence. Storing passwords 
or digital keys on local systems is not a safe 
approach because if an unauthorized person 
gets access to the system, then he or she could 
compromise the passwords or digital keys. 
Using smart cards to store the digital 
credentials is one of the best approaches, as it 
securely stores the digital keys or passwords 
(Smartcard Alliance & Alliance, 2014). We 
propose to use smart cards to store private 
keys of forensics examiners and to generate 
digital signatures to ensure the integrity of the 
digital evidence. This approach will make the 
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contents tamperproof and as private keys are 
unique, the forensic examiner can be verified as 
well.  
Our proposed solution is the development 
of an automated tool that can ensure the 
integrity of digital evidence. It should be able 
to not only protect the digital evidence but 
also preserve digital chain of custody. In order 
to achieve this, we have developed a prototype 
of a forensic tool with the following 
functionalities and it works in the order 
specified below: 
1. Authenticate and Authorize the 
forensic examiner using smart card 
credentials 
2. Extracting a bit by bit image of the 
whole disk drive containing the 
evidence (Our prototype tool only 
supports RAW imaging for now. Other 
imaging formats like E01, AFF etc. can 
also be used instead of RAW format) 
3. Creating a digital chain of custody and 
appending it to the extracted image  
4. Computing hash (SHA1) over the 
extracted image and the digital chain of 
custody 
5. Generating digital signature over the 
computed hash by using private key 
(RSA-1024 bit) of the forensics 
examiner stored in the smart card  
6. Appending the generated digital 
signature at the end of chain of custody 
This approach will ensure that any of the 
contents in the evidence or the digital chain of 
custody does not get tampered. Integrity of 
both the digital evidence and its chain of 
custody can be verified. It removes the 
possibility of even a single bit being changed in 
the extracted evidence, and its digital chain of 
custody to go undetected. This can guarantee 
the digital evidence integrity and digital chain 
of custody preservation. 
We have created a simple template for the 
digital chain of custody. In our tool, we have 
stored the extracted image and its digital chain 
of custody in a structure as shown in Figure 1. 
The forensic examiner needs to enter the case 
number and the evidence number manually. 
The rest of the data is inserted automatically 
by the tool. 
The digital chain of custody consists of two 
types of rings; first ring and additional ring. 
When the digital evidence is extracted by the 
forensic examiner, first ring is added. 
Whenever the evidence is handed over to an 
authorized person, additional ring is added to 
the chain of custody. In the chain of custody 
there can be only one first ring, whereas the 
number of additional rings depends upon 
number of persons to whom the evidence is 
handed over. Each handover adds an 
additional ring to the chain of custody.  First 
ring is composed of 1024 bytes, whereas each 
additional ring is composed of 512 bytes. 
Structure and composition of the rings are 
discussed in the subsections.  
 
 
 
 
Protecting Digital Evidence Integrity and Preserving … JDFSL V12N2 
© 2017 ADFSL   Page 125 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 First Ring 
First ring of the digital chain of custody is 
divided into five sections. These sections are of 
different sizes. The first and third sections are 
of variable size, whereas the second, fourth and 
fifth sections are of fixed size as shown in 
Figure 2. The details of each section are as 
follows. 
 Case Information 
This section contains information related to 
the case. It starts with a four bytes tag, which 
in hex is, “10 00 00 00.” The next four bytes 
(5th -8th) represents the size of this section in 
bytes, including the tag bytes. The next 
sixteen bytes (9th- 24th) consist of four sections, 
each of which consists of four bytes, 
representing the case number field length, the 
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evidence number field length, the examiner 
name field length and the examiner ID field 
length in bytes, in the same order. Structure of 
this section is shown in Figure 3.  
 Disk Geometry 
This section contains information about the 
geometry of the disk drive whose image is 
extracted. It starts with a four bytes tag, 
which in hex is, “30 00 00 00.” The next four 
bytes (5th -8th) represent the size of this section 
in bytes, including the tag bytes. The next four 
bytes (9th – 12th) represent the total cylinders 
in the disk drive. The four bytes after that 
(13th – 16th) represent the tracks per cylinder 
in the disk drive. The next four bytes (17th – 
20th) represent the sectors per track in the disk 
drive. The next eight bytes (21st – 28th) 
represent the total number of sectors in the 
disk drive. Structure of this section is shown in 
Figure 4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Physical Drive Information 
This section contains information about the 
physical disk drive whose image is extracted. It 
starts with a four bytes tag, which in hex is, 
“50 00 00 00.” The next four bytes (5th -8th) 
represent the size of this section in bytes, 
including the tag bytes. The next 16 bytes (9th 
– 24th) consist of four sections, each of which 
consists of four bytes, representing the drive 
model field length, the serial number field 
length, the disk interface field length and the 
disk size field length in bytes, in the same 
order. Structure of this section is shown in 
Figure 5. 
 Imaging Information 
This section contains information that is 
related to the imaging of the disk drive. It 
starts with a four bytes tag, which in hex is, 
“70 00 00 00.” The next four bytes (5th -8th) 
represent the size of this section in bytes, 
including the tag bytes. The next eight bytes 
(9th – 16th) represent the time when the image 
acquisition was started. The next eight bytes 
(17th – 24th) represent the time when the image 
acquisition was completed. The next sixteen 
bytes (25th – 40th) represent the geographical 
location of the forensic examiner at the time of 
acquisition, where first eight bytes (25th – 32nd) 
represent latitude and last eight bytes (33rd – 
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40th) represent longitude. Structure of this 
section is shown in Figure 6. 
 Digital Signature 
The last 128 bytes section contains the digital 
signature which is generated via a smart card 
using RSA 1024 bit private key of the forensic 
examiner. 
1024 bytes are reserved for the digital 
chain of custody in which first 896 bytes 
contain data related to the chain of custody 
and the last 128 bytes are for the digital 
signature.  
 Additional Ring 
This ring is composed of 512 bytes with a 4 
bytes starting tag of “90 00 00 00” in hex. This 
ring includes the authorized person’s name, 
his/her ID (name and ID are stored in his/her 
smart card), time at which the evidence is 
handed over, location of the evidence hand 
over and his/her digital signature via a smart 
card. This digital signature needs to be 
calculated over the previous chain of custody 
rings and the current ring’s first 384 bytes. 
The calculated digital signature is then stored 
in last 128 bytes of the current ring.  
 ANALYSIS AND 
COMPARISON 
If we compare the proposed approach to the 
approach being used to ensure the integrity of 
the digital evidence, then the proposed 
approach is undoubtedly the better one. It 
rules out doubts about the unauthorized 
modification of the evidence; it provides non-
repudiation. It does a better job in protecting 
the integrity than the techniques currently 
being used. In terms of cost, the proposed 
approach costs a little more. The additional 
cost is incurred due to the use of smart cards, 
which are cheap in price. The added cost is 
well justified in terms of the level of trust and 
clarity it provides in integrity of digital 
evidence and its digital chain of custody. In 
terms of time, this approach takes hardly a 
second extra than the techniques currently 
being used. This added time is for digital 
signature generation which takes less than one 
second. So, the difference in terms of time is 
negligible. In addition to the digital evidence 
integrity, our proposed approach preserves the 
chain of custody but the current tools do not 
offer such functionality. This comparison is 
based on the results of the tool that we 
developed as a proof of concept to analyze the 
proposed approach.   
 CONCLUSION AND 
FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
The proposed solution is effective and feasible. 
It provides not only digital evidence integrity 
protection but also the digital chain of custody 
preservation. We developed a tool as a proof of 
concept with limited functionality to evaluate 
our proposed solution. An industrial standard 
forensic tool can be developed based on the 
concept that we used to develop our tool. The 
forensic tool should extract forensic image and 
store it in multiple formats, contrary to our 
tool that only stores image in RAW format. 
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